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RELIGION AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS:
A PROPOSAL TO REVISE SECTION 501(c)(3)
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
INTRODUCTION
Religion and politics have been intertwined since the birth of our
nation.' In a democracy created to reflect the social fabric of its
citizens, religious groups have always advocated moral positions to
further or impede political causes and political campaigns.' Although
critical junctures in American history have long been accompanied by
religious and political controversies,3 as well as by interreligious
tensions,4 a particularly powerful religious-political crusade began to
emerge in the period immediately following the Second World
War.5 Political preaching has since become an increasingly common
phenomenon in religious institutions throughout the United States.'
1. B. Dulce & E. Richter, Religion and the Presidency 1-11 (1962).
2. Since the campaign of Thomas Jefferson, religious and political controversy
has been prominent in approximately one of every three campaigns for the
Presidency. Id. at v. See generally H. Foote, The Religion of Thomas Jefferson 45
(1960) (electioneering pamphlets written and distributed by clergymen accused Jef-
ferson of atheism and thus "too dangerous an enemy of Christianity to be presi-
dent").
3. See generally B. Dulce & E. Richter, supra note 1; R. Morgan, The Politics
of Religious Conflict (1968).
4. Religious groups have been united in their political efforts on issues, such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and divided over others, such as temperance. R. Mor-
gan, supra note 3, at 27, 45-47; see Methodist Bishops Attack Catholics, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1947, at 26, col. 2 (The Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church, then
the largest Protestant denomination in the United States, "accused the Roman
Catholic Church of political activities in this country and abroad, which . . .
amounted to bigotry and denial of religious liberty."). See also R. Morgan, The Su-
preme Court and Religion 82 (1972); R. Morgan, supra note 3, at 19-36.
5. R. Morgan, supra note 3, at 28-29. This increased activism has been attri-
buted to the rapid social changes that have occurred in recent years. One commenta-
tor suggests that the appearance of religious groups in the political arena has been
triggered by two major developments: the increased governmental support for wel-
fare services, and non-public educational facilities. Id. at 37-40.
6. An Angry Young Congressman Criticizes Special Interest Groups, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1981, § A, at 24, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Congressman Criticizes
Special Interest Groups]; Taylor, Going to Court With the Strange Bedfellows of
Politics, Religion and Tax Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1980, § D, at 12, col. 1;
Briggs, Dispute on Religion Raised by Campaign, N.Y Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § A, at
31, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Dispute on Religion]; Reagan, Moral Majority: Will
the Alliance Last?, N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 9, 1980, at 62, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Reagan, Moral Majority]; Briggs, Debate is Growing on Legalities of Religious Activ-
ism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1980, § A, at 22, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Debate is
Growing]; Fundamentalists' Activity In Politics Called a Danger, N.Y. Times, Sept.
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During the 1980 election year, a number of religious groups par-
ticipated in energetic presidential and congressional campaign
activities7 to promote the election of politicians who share their
beliefs.8 This activism has given rise to numerous debates among
25, 1980, § B, at 10, col. 6; Lewis, Political Religion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25. 1980, §
A, at 27, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Lewis I]; Briggs. The Influence of Church
Leaders in Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1980, § A, at 18, col. 1. A Tide of Born-
Again Politics, Newsweek, Sept. 15, 1980, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Born-Again
Politics]. Clergymen and political professionals have joined forces to establish politi-
cal organizations, such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice Moral Government
Fund, and the Religious Roundtable, to endorse openly, as well as oppose, specific
candidates for public office. These groups are organized as political action committees
and are thus permitted to engage in lobbying and electioneering activity. See note 75
infra. They have directly appealed to ministers throughout the nation, however, to
encourage congregations to join in the religious-political movement. Born-Again Poli-
tics, supra, at 36; Lewis I, supra, § A, at 27, col. 5.
7. Described as being "more electoral than Biblical," the religious-political cam-
paign strategy included voter registration drives, voter education activity, organiza-
tional assistance to candidates, financial support to candidates, distribution of voting
report cards, and communications by clergy to congregations concerning political
choices. Born-Again Politics, supra note 6, at 28-29. See also Congressman Criticizes
Special Interest Groups, supra note 6, § A, at 24, cols. 3-4; Dispute on Religion,
supra note 6, § A, at 31, col. 1; Reagan, Moral Majority, supra note 6, at 62, col. 3.
8. See, e.g., Dispute on Religion, supra note 6, § A, at 31, col. 1. Reagan,
Moral Majority, supra note 6, at 62, col. 3; Born-Again Politics, supra note 6, at 31.
A cogent example of religious intervention in the political arena wvas a letter written
on church stationery by Archbishop Humberto Cardinal Medeiros of Boston that was
distributed and read to congregations in Massachusetts during the campaign of cer-
tain pro-abortion congressional candidates. In his letter, Cardinal Medeiros warned
that "[tihose who make abortions possible by law-such as legislators and those who
promote, defend and elect the same lawmakers-cannot separate themselves totally
from that guilt which accompanies this horrendous crime and deadly sin. If you are
for true human freedom-and for life-you will follow your conscience when you
vote, you will vote to save 'our children, born and unborn.' " Lewis, Religion and
Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1980, § A, at 31, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Lewis
II]. Although the targeted pro-abortion candidates were not defeated, the abortion
controversy became a major issue in the campaign as a result of the Cardinal's mes-
sage. Archbishop's Attack Fails to Defeat 2 Candidates in Massachusetts Vote, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 1980, § B, at 13, col. 2. Sharp criticism, sparked by Cardinal
Medeiros' letter, called for a "distinction between preaching a faith and using the
pulpit to intimidate a congregation into voting the church's way." The Archbishop
and Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1980, § A, at 26, cols. 1-2 [hereinafter cited as
The Archbishop and Abortion]. Nevertheless, attempts by religious leaders to deter
voters from choosing certain candidates were not new to the 1980 election year.
E.g., B. Dulce & E. Richter, supra note 1, at 159, 193, 204 (religious leader, Dr.
W.A. Criswell, warned against voting for John F. Kennedy in a broadcast sermon
that was printed and distributed during the Kennedy campaign); H. Foote, supra
note 2, at 45 (electioneering pamphlets issued by clergy attacking Thomas Jefferson
as an atheist); Puerto Rico Bishops Bar Vote for Munoz, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1960,
at 1, col. 8 [hereinafter cited as Puerto Rico Bishops] (Roman Catholic bishops issued
a pastoral letter forbidding Catholic voters to vote for Governor Munoz Matin of
Puerto Rico, a Catholic who endorsed birth control and sterilization). In fact, it has
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politicians,9 commentators, ° and theologians" regarding the proper
mixture of religion and politics in the United States. Perhaps the
most important issue raised in the present controversy concerns the
tax treatment of religious organizations that engage in political cam-
paign activity.
Religious organizations are considered tax-exempt organizations
long been viewed as a religious duty for the bishop to advise his parishioners on
their political choices. B. Dulce & E. Richter, supra note 1, at 17, 202; Puerto Rican
Attorneys Assail Bishops' Rules on How to Vote, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1960, at 9, col.
2 (church politics dictated interference in American politics); Puerto Rico Bishops,
supra, at 12, col. 1 (pastoral letter stating that it is the duty of the Catholic prelates
to prohibit church members from voting for a certain political party).
9. In the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan openly endorsed and en-
couraged the role of religious leaders during a campaign stop at a "revival meeting
cum political rally" of 15,000 church leaders in Dallas, Texas. He stated that they
had a duty to be involved in politics. Born-Again Politics, supra note 6, at 36. The
incumbent, President Carter, expressed his fear that, in view of Ronald Reagan's
alignment with religious-political coalitions, a victory by Reagan "would increase divi-
sions between Christians and Jews." Carter and Reagan Comments Tangle Cam-
paigns in a Controversy Surrounding Evangelical Group, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980,
§ D, at 14, col. 1. During the presidential campaign debate in September 1980,
candidates Ronald Reagan and John Anderson were asked whether the church should
guide the political decisions of officeholders and the voting choices of congregations.
Transcript of Campaign's First Presidential Debate, With Reagan vs. Anderson, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1980, § B, at 6, col. 1. Ronald Reagan said that "too many of our
churches have been too reluctant to speak up in behalf of what they believe is proper
in Government." Id. at 7, col. 3. While Reagan expressed his belief that the first
amendment permits everyone in this country to "try to persuade others to follow
their leader," id., John Anderson rebutted by saying that, "to try to tell the
parishioners of any church . . . how they should vote or for whom they should vote
... violates the principle of separation of church and state." Id. at 7, col. 4.
10. E.g., Taylor, supra note 6, at 12, col. 1; Lewis II, supra note 8, § A, at 31,
col. 2; The Archbishop and Abortion, supra note 8, at 26, cols. 1-2; Potter, A Chris-
tian America, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, § A, at 31, col. 1; Briggs, Christians on
Right and Left Take Up Ballot and Cudgel, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1980, § 4, at 20E,
col. 2; Meehan, Free Speech is Indivisible, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, § A, at 27,
col. 2; Lewis I, supra note 6, at 27, col. 5.
11. The religious community is divided concerning the extent to which it should
be involved in partisan politics. R. Morgan, supra note 3, at 19-36. Some religious
leaders believe that they do not have the competence to deal with political ques-
tions. For example, Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran pastor, expressed his concern
that religious leaders are "profoundly immature" and thus "don't really understand
the ethical and philosophical traditions of democracy or how to bring about change in
a pluralistic society." Born-Again Politics, supra note 6, at 29. They reject the notion
that the redemption of society may be achieved through political means. The
evangelist preacher Pat Robertson has stated that "God isn't a right-winger or a left-
winger." Id. at 29. The Reverend Theodore Edquist has commented that, "[i]f in
order to be faithful you have to support a certain stand regarding Russia, what's the
next step? ... It strikes at the very heart of the whole notion of religious pluralism
and religious and political freedom." Id. at 36. Other religious leaders defend the
idea of political participation by churches, yet dispute the approach taken by certain
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under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).' To
maintain this status, however, section 501(c)(3) requires that the
organization 3 "not participate in, or intervene in .. .any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."" Religious-
political activism during the 1980 campaign has brought into question
the constitutionality," as well as the efficacy,' 6 of the electioneering
prohibition in section 501(c)(3). Some groups argue that the prohibi-
tion against electioneering must be more strictly enforced by the
IRS 17 to ensure that the law is applied equally to all organizations
religious-political action groups. Leaders of 13 religious organizations issued a state-
ment that rejected the "narrow range of issues" used for measuring the morality of
political candidates by the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, and Christian Voter's
Victory Fund. Nonetheless, the signers of the statement supported the political partic-
ipation of evangelist groups. Religious Leaders Fault Policies of Evangelical Political
Groups, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1980, § B, at 6, col. 1; see Erangelicals Debate Their
Role in Battling Secularism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 4.
12. I.R.C. § 501(a). Contributions to organizations exempt under § 501(a) are tax
deductible under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).
13. Other groups, such as charitable, scientific, and educational groups, are also
covered by § 501(c)(3). This Note is only concerned wvith the tax treatment of reli-
gious organizations. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, all secular § 501(c)(3)
organizations will be referred to as "charitable" organizations.
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Exempt organizations can, however, engage in lobbying
for or against positions on political issues, as distinguished from candidates, but such
activity must not become a "substantial part" of the organization's activities. Id. See
also id. § 501(h). The regulations explain that an organization that "participates or
intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposi-
tion to any candidate for public office" is an "action organization" and therefore does
not qualify for § 501(c)(3) status. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(e)(3)-l(c)(3iuii) (1959).
15. Debate is Growing, supra note 6, at 22, cal. 3; Taylor, supra note 6, at 12,
col. 5; Church Takes I.R.S. to Court On Tax Status, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1980, §
B, at 8, col. i [hereinafter cited as Church Takes IRS to Court].
16. Complaint at 17, Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Miller, No. 80 Civ. 5590
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1980); see Taylor, supra note 6, at 12, col. 1.
17. Pro-abortion groups filed suit in federal district court in October 1980, accus-
ing the IRS of neglecting its duty to remove the tax-exempt status of various religious
organizations allegedly in violation of the campaign prohibition in § 501(c)(3). Abor-
tion Rights Mobilization v. Miller, No. 80 Civ. 5590 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1980).
It should be noted that two procedural problems may prevent the plaintiffs in this
case from arguing their cause before the court. First, the Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C.
§ 7421(a), bars injunctive suits regarding the collection of taxes from being heard in
federal district courts. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752
(1974) (Anti-Injunction Act barred corporation's challenge to constitutionality of §
501(c)(3) lobbying restriction because the Court held the purpose of the suit %as to
restrain taxation). Second, plaintiffs may be denied standing for failure to show a
sufficient causal connection between the government's inaction and their injury. See
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1975). The plaintiffs assert that removing deductibility
from contributions made to violators would result in increased donations to organiza-
tions that abide by the § 501(c)(3) restrictions. Thus, the plaintiffs conclude that lack
of enforcement results in less money available to exempt organizations that properly
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subject to section 501(c)(3).'8 Others contend that the provision's re-
striction on political freedoms must be enforced only when violations
are clear so as not to infringe on precious fundamental freedoms." In
addition, some constitutional scholars question the validity of impos-
ing any restrictions on political uses of tax-exempt funds. 0
In view of the various challenges that have been made with regard
to the enforcement and continued validity of the absolute campaign
prohibition contained within section 501(c)(3), the law should be
amended. This Note will propose a viable alternative within the tax
law2 ' that will best accommodate the disparate concerns expressed by
religious groups that are interested in their political futures. The im-
petus for the revision is provided by the substantial problems of en-
forcement created by the prohibition.' The justification for this tax
reform is twofold. First, the tax policy underlying the prohibition is
of less consequence in view of legislative changes in the tax law
affecting political campaign activity.' Second, the campaign clause as
refrain from partisan political activity. Complaint at 12-13, Abortion Rights Mobiliza-
tion v. Miller, No. 80 Civ. 5590 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1980). The causal connec-
tion is tenuous, however, and thus, the complaint may fail to survive a challenge to
plaintiffs' standing.
18. Complaint at 12-14, Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Miller, No. 80 Civ. 5590
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1980). The complainants claim that the government's failure
to police alleged violations of the tax law by religious (anti-abortion) groups places
pro-abortion exempt organizations at a relative disadvantage because they must ab-
stain from competing with political opponents for fear of losing tax-exempt status. Id.
at 13; see pt. I(A) infra.
19. The United States Catholic Conference and the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, for example, have claimed that the IRS has gone "beyond the intent of Con-
gress" and has infringed upon "First Amendment freedoms of speech and associa-
tion." Taylor, supra note 6, at 12, cols. 4-5. They fear that selective governmental
surveillance of political activities by exempt groups under the vague regulations that
accompany the Code may prove discriminatory against groups that are out of favor
with a particular administration. Id. at 12, col. 5. The United Church of Christ has
alleged that IRS regulations represent an unconstitutional interference with the
church's first amendment right to publicize its opinion on the voting records of par-
ticular members of Congress. Church Takes IRS to Court, supra note 15, at 8, col.
1; Churches, Politics And the Tax Man, Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1980, at 46 [hereinafter
cited as Churches, Politics And the Tax Man].
20. Debate is Growing, supra note 6, at 22, col. 3 (quoting Professor Laurence
Tribe of the Harvard Law School); Taylor, supra note 6, at 12, col. 5 (quoting Profes-
sor Choper of Boalt Hall, the University of California's law school).
21. This Note will focus on income tax treatment of partisan campaign conduct by
§ 501(c)(3) religious organizations. For articles dealing with related issues, see Birm-
ingham & Peartree, Taxation of Political Contributions, 7 Creighton L. Rev. 554
(1974) (considerations relating to contribution of appreciated securities to political
candidates); Schoenblum, The Changing Meaning of "Gift": An Analysis of the Tax
Court's Decision in Carson v. Commissioner, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 641 (1979) (gift tax
consequences of campaign contributions).
22. See pt. I(A) infra.
23. See pt. I(B) infra.
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presently stated places severe limitations upon a religious group's
fundamental right to engage in political speech activity.2? The pro-
posed revision will reflect these concerns as well as the limitations
imposed by the establishment clause of the first amendment. "?
I. CONSIDERATIONS MILITATING AGAINST AN ABSOLLrrE
PROHIBITION OF CAMPAIGN AcTivrTy
A. Section 501(c)(3) Enforcement Problems
Charitable tax-exempt organizations have raised serious questions
concerning the enforcement of section 501(c)(3). They have claimed,
for example, that the enforcement by the IRS of the section 501(c)(3)
campaign restriction works in favor of some religious groups."
Specifically, they allege that the IRS has neglected to enforce the
campaign condition against certain religious organizations participat-
ing in electioneering activity, thereby depriving other exempt organ-
izations of their fifth amendment right to equal protection of the
law.2 At the same time, religious groups that have been the subject
of IRS investigations have alleged that the IRS is enforcing the sec-
tion 501(c)(3) campaign prohibition too strictly. -'
Plaintiffs challenging the application of the tax law, however, will
confront a heavy burden to prove that the allegedly unequal applica-
tion of the law constitutes discriminatory conduct by the IRS. ' The
enforcement issue was squarely before the court in Christian Echoes
24. See pt. I(C) infra.
25. See pt. II infra.
26. Complaint at 8, Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Miller, No. 80 Civ. 5590
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1980).
27. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiffs in this suit claim that, when the campaign restriction is
equally enforced, all organizations that are potentially exempt "find their funds
equally available or unavailable for the purpose of intervening in political campaigns
... [and] find potential donors equally willing or unwilling to contribute, depending
on whether contributions to the organization are deductible." id. It is claimed that
uneven enforcement results in a relative disadvantage for those charitable organiza-
tions that refrain from political activity for fear of losing tax-exempt status and deduct-
ibility of contributions. Id. at 14 (due to uneven enforcement "campaigns have been
disproportionately influenced by opponents of abortion because [charitable
organizations] did not enjoy the same financial and political advantage as ...
[religious] organizations"); see Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)
("[S]ince purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation... everyone in the
community should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the
Treasury of the United States is concerned.").
28. California Case in Third Week, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1980, § A, at 17. col. I
[hereinafter cited as California Case]; Church Takes IRS to Court, supra note 15, at
8, col. 1; Churches, Politics And the Tax Man, supra note 19, at 46.
29. In addition, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing to bring their
claim. See note 17 supra.
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National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,3 in which a nonprofit reli-
gious corporation filed suit claiming it had been discriminatorily
selected for removal of tax-exempt status in violation of the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment. 3' Although the district court
found the record replete with administrative abuses by the IRS, and
inferred that the IRS had arbitrarily singled out the evangelist
organization, 3 the court of appeals remained unconvinced.' It de-
clared that the religious group must show "no reasonable relationship
to a proper governmental objective" to prove discriminatory enforce-
ment by the IRS.Y The court stated that "[i]n order to establish
discrimination violating the due process clause, the taxpayer must
show discrimination based on differences of religion, race, politics or
an unacceptable classification." '
Although it may be an insurmountable burden for an individual or
group to show discriminatory enforcement by the IRS, the numerous
enforcement complaints do reflect the deficiencies in the tax statute
as written. The major problem is that campaign conduct is not ade-
quately defined. According to the regulations, an organization cannot
qualify for exempt status "if it participates or intervenes, directly or
indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office."36 A further attempt is made to clar-
ify the parameters of proscribed conduct as activities which "include,
but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of written or
printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in
opposition to . . . a candidate." 3 Nevertheless, these guidelines are
clearly inadequate.' The implementation of the campaign prohibi-
30. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
31. Id. at 853.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 857.
34. Id. See also United States v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757, 759
(N.D. I1l.) ("[t]ax exemptions are subject to the limitation that they and the classifica-
tion upon which they are based be reasonable, not arbitrary, and apply to all persons
similarly situated"), affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
35. 470 F.2d at 857; accord, American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89,
92 (1900) (Discrimination based "upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious
opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having no possible connection
with the duties of citizens as taxpayers . . . would be . . . a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to the less favored classes.").
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1959) (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. The Senate Finance Committee has expressed concern that "the standards as
to the permissible level of activities under the present law are too vague and thereby
tend to encourage subjective and selective enforcement." S. Rep. No. 938-pt. II,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4030,
4104. This concern led to the enactment of the § 50101) alternative in the Code,
I.R.C. § 501(h), a congressional attempt to clarify the "substantial" standard used for
lobbying activity. See note 48 infra. The new section provides a formula for apprais-
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tion requires delicate determinations to be made in distinguishing
whether speech activity is permissible discussion of controversial pub-
lic issues or impermissible electioneering activity.' Given the issue-
oriented nature of political campaigns, this distinction may prove to
be problematic because "[c]andidates . . . are intimately tied to pub-
lic issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions.
Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on
various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest."'  The IRS' task of traversing this fragile line is com-
ing an organization's level of legislative activity, but fails to illuminate tile area ol
electioneering activity. The same concern may justify revision of the political cam-
paign intervention prohibition to permit a limited amount of such activity by all §
501(c)(3) organizations.
39. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (per curiam). In an analogous
context, the Court recognized the difficulty of drawing lines in the area of "the sup-
posedly clearly-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and
solicitation," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945), and stated that the
blurred borders put "the speaker in these circumstances wholly at the mercy of the
varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be
drawn as to his intent and meaning." Id. (striking down a state regulation of solicita-
tion by labor organizers). The problem of a chilling effect created by so nebulous a
restriction was also addressed by the Court. "Such a distinction offers no security for
free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be
said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim." Id. The need for further clarifica-
tion was acute during President Kennedy's campaign, when anti-Catholic literature
and sermons were abundant. See B. Dulce & E. Richter, supra note 1, at 194.
Addressing this issue, one commentator explained that "[wlhile presumably a sermon
or series of sermons which touched upon political subjects would not amount to
'propaganda' as used in the statute, nothing in the statute prevents such an inter-
pretation by the court." Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemp-
tion, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 397, 420 n. 172 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Religion in
Politics]. Doubt concerning the propriety of political conduct is pervasive among §
501(c)(3) groups. Reference to prior revenue rulings issued by the IRS is of little
assistance. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160, 160-61 (§ 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion "operating a broadcasting station presenting religious, educational, and public
interest programs, is not participating in political campaigns on behalf of public
candidates . . . by providing reasonable air time equally available to all ... candi-
dates . . . and [by] endorsing no candidate or viewpoint"); Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2
C.B. 194 (IRS denied exempt status under § 501(c)(4) to social welfare group that
rated candidates on a nonpartisan basis and disseminated the ratings to general pub-
lie because rating process was considered intervention or participation "on behalf of
those candidates favorably rated and in opposition to those less favorably rated");
Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125 (IRS denied exemption to organization created to
improve public education because it participated in a school board election campaign
on behalf of a candidate "even though its process of selection may have been com-
pletely objective and unbiased and was intended primarily to educate and inform").
Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213 (IRS granted exemption to an organization urging
high standards of ethics and morality in elections when the activity was not associ-
ated with a particular candidate).
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
When the D.C. Circuit considered the Buckley case, it stated that "[p]ublic discus-
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plicated by the vagueness of section 501(c)(3) and the accompanying
regulations. It has also given rise to the fear among exempt organiza-
tions of arbitrary discriminatory enforcement of the campaign prohibi-
tion against organizations advocating ideologies and supporting candi-
dates opposed to the administration in power.4'
Finally, these enforcement problems are greatly compounded by
the extemely high stakes involved. If the IRS determines that a sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organization has acted in support of a candidate, it must
revoke entirely the organization's tax-exempt status.4" This in itself
may cause the IRS to be reluctant 43 in enforcing section 501(c)(3). It
also brings into question the continued viability of an absolute pro-
sion of public issues which also are campaign issues readily and often unavoidably
draws in candidates and their positions, their voting records and other official con-
duct. Discussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to influence public
opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at
elections." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam), affd
in part, rev'd in part per curiam 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. Such accusations have been made by the United States Catholic Conference,
in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union. Taylor, supra note 6, at 12,
col. 4. See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). The
fear of selective enforcement is not without justification. Until the 1970's, the Code
provided no express exemption for political committees. It has been explained that
" '[t]he income tax status of political parties has been in legal limbo since the begin-
ning of our income tax system. It is a matter of history that the Internal Revenue
Service has never attempted to tax political parties, although there is nothing specific
in the Internal Revenue Code which says that they are nontaxable .... They have
just grown up that way.' " Bruce, Taxing of Political Organizations, Candidates,
Contributors, 62 A.B.A.J. 123, 123 n.3 (1976) (quoting former Treasury Secretary
Schultz); see Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810. Despite the general hands-off policy
exercised by the IRS, the Communist Party was selectively subjected to income tax
in 1956. Communist Party v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Such an
anomaly in administrative behavior supports an argument that the IRS may again
wield its sword against "splinter groups . . . not in the mainstream of American
politics." Taxing Political Contributions: The IRS Balks at Reform, 23 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 322, 330 (1973). See generally Bruce, supra. The IRS also withdrew exempt
status from the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), " 'a movement of Christian pro-
test against war, and of faith in a better way than violence for the solution of all
conflicts.'" Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics, 73 Yale L.J. 661, 662
(1964) (quoting FOR's statement of purpose). The IRS withdrew the group's tax-
exempt status because it considered FOR's goals- "achievement of peace and inter-
national reconciliation through love"-to be political in character. Id. at 662-63.
42. In view of the absolute nature of the campaign prohibition, the law does not
tolerate any intervention or participation in the political campaign arena by a group
enjoying tax-exempt status. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
43. Courts have also shown reluctance in revoking tax benefits from religious
organizations. E.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924); Elisian Guild,
Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969); Morey v. Riddell, 205 F, Supp.
918 (S.D. Cal. 1962). Courts have exhibited a liberal approach in cases concerning
business activity by religious organizations by ruling according to an intuitive sense
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hibition on campaign activity. It is evident that the limitation on cam-
paign activity would be more effective if the stakes were reduced and
more precise guidelines were set forth and made available to the
affected organizations.
B. Demise of the Treasury Neutrality Tax Policy
1. History of the Restriction on Campaign Activit,
The present statutory framework within which religious organiza-
tions enjoy tax-exempt status, conditioned on their abstention from
campaign activity, developed over a number of years. The tax exemp-
tion for charitable and religious organizations was first enacted in the
tax law of 1894 and reenacted in the Act of 1913.11 Groups organized
and operated exclusively for charitable or religious purposes were
granted tax-exempt status because of the benefit the public obtains
from their activities.4' Although the Code did not contain a restric-
tion on political activity prior to 1934, it was recognized in both the
regulations4 6 and decisions 17 that such activity was grounds for de-
nying the exemption.
about the activities, rather than adhering strictly to statutory construction. Thus, it
may be inferred that the courts are not satisfied with the guidelines established in
the regulations for determining exempt status. Religion in Politics, supra note 39, at
405 n.55.
44. The exemption itself is traceable to the income tax law of 1894, which in-
eluded an exemption for any corporation or association organized exclusively for reli-
gious, educational, or charitable purposes. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28
Stat. 556. This tax statute was declared unconstitutional, however, in Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The exemption reappeared in the 1913
Act, Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 172, and is now contained in
I.R.C. § 501. A provision allowing a taxpayer to deduct a contribution from his per-
sonal income tax was enacted in 1917, Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat.
330 (now I.R.C. § 170), and contained a stipulation requiring the beneficiary of the
contribution to be exclusively organized for religious, educational, or charitable pur-
poses. Id., 40 Stat. 330. A similar deduction was added to the estate tax law in 1926,
Int. Rev. Code of 1926, ch. 20, § 1095(3) 44 Stat. 835 (now I.R.C. § 2055(a)), and to
the gift tax law in 1932. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 505(a)(2)(B), 47 Stat. 248
(now I.R.C. § 2522).
45. "The Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from pub-
lic funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."
H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).
46. The regulations contained a prohibition of "controversial" or "partisan" polit-
ical activity in 1919. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919), in T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Decs.
Int. Rev. 285 (1920).
47. See, e.g., Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) (seeking to re-
peal anti-birth control legislation); Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1927) (disseminat-




The first limitation on any type of political activity appeared in the
Code of 1934, which contained a prohibition against a "substantial"
amount of lobbying activity or "carrying on propaganda." 8  This
limitation on lobbying activity became part of the income tax law" in
response to the use of charities as vehicles through which private
business interests were asserting their political views.' The restric-
48. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 23(o)(2), 101(6), 48 Stat. 690, 700. The
"substantial standard" was carried forward to the Code of 1954. I.R.C. §
501(c)(3)(1954). The imprecise standard of the statute gave courts latitude within
which to liberally construe the law and thus avoid removing the exempt status of
charitable organizations. See Clark, The Limitations on Political Activities: A Discor-
dant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 Va. L. Rev. 439, 449 (1960). One court did, in
fact, take the opportunity to narrow the scope of prohibited activity. In Seasongood
v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955), the Sixth Circuit distinguished polit-
ical action, such as direct lobbying and support for candidates, from permissible
political education, such as enhancing public awareness of legislative proposals. Id. at
911-12; see Clark, supra, at 449-50. Judicial liberalization of the prerequisite for ex-
empt status met with disapproval by the Treasury. Id. at 450-52. In 1959, the IRS
issued regulations that expressly disallowed most grass roots lobbying, Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1959) (prohibition on "urg[ing] the public to contact" govern-
ment officials in an attempt to influence legislation), a political activity arguably per-
missible under Seasongood. Clark, supra, at 451. The "substantial" standard
frequently has been attacked as being too vague to permit a clear understanding of
the range of authorized political activity. See, e.g., "Americans United" Inc. v. Wal-
ters, 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Christian Echoes Nat'l
Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 864 (1973); Clark, supra, at 446 n.32. Nevertheless, "substantial" is still the key
operative word in the statute for the permissible level of lobbying activity by reli-
gious organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 501(h) was added to the Code in 1976
"to set relatively specific expenditure limits to replace the uncertain standards of
present law, to provide a more rational relationship between the sanctions and the
violations of standards, and to make it more practical to properly enforce the law," S.
Rep. No. 938-pt. II, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4030, 4104. The actual calculation of the lobbying ceiling is detailed in
I.R.C. §§ 501(h) and 4911(c). Section 501(h) represents a more precise alternative
available to charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3). Churches, however, requested
to be excluded from the new provision to avoid compliance with the detailed disclo-
sure requirements. S. Rep. 938-pt. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4030, 4108 ("As a result of concerns expressed by a
number of churches and in response to their specific request, the committee amend-
ment does not permit a church or a convention or association of churches . . . to
elect to come under these provisions." (footnote omitted)).
49. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 23(o), 101(b), 48 Stat. 690, 700. The lob-
bying restriction also was added to other areas of tax law. E.g., id. § 101(13), 48 Stat.
700 (exempt corporations); id. § 406, 48 Stat. 755 (estate tax); id. § 517, 48 Stat. 760
(gift tax).
50. 78 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Reed) (a contribution made to an
exempt organization should not be deductible "as if it were a charitable contribution
if it is a selfish one made to advance the personal interests of the giver of the
money"); Comment, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 Houston
L. Rev. 480, 488 & n.56 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Church Lobbying].
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tion prevented businesses from gaining political influence by means
of tax deductible contributions. 5' At the same time, the restriction
on lobbying ensured that tax-exempt groups would not deviate from
the beneficial public purpose that justified their special tax status.Y
The enactment of the lobbying restriction also has been attributed
to the treasury neutrality rationale expressed by the Second Circuit
in Slee v. Commissioner.3 The court declared that the American
Birth Control League's political attempts to repeal laws preventing
birth control removed it from the Code's definition of a charitable
organization.' The deductible status of contributions to the League
was withdrawn to ensure that the government remain outside the
sphere of partisan political activitym and thereby prevent the appear-
ance of federal support of selected political views.' Judge Learned
Hand stated that "[p]olitical agitation as such is outside the statute,
however innocent the aim. . . . Controversies of that sort must be
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from
them." 5
The campaign intervention clause in section 501(c)(3) was added as
a floor amendment to the Code in 1954.," It was introduced with
little explanation by its sponsor, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.' In
51. 78 Cong. Rec. 5959 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Harrison) C'mhere are certain
organizations which are receiving contributions in order to influence legislation and
carry on propaganda. The committee thought there ought to be an amendment
which would stop that, so that is why we have put this amendment in the bill.");
Church Lobbying, supra note 50, at 488 & n.55. Businesses have since been permit-
ted to deduct, as ordinary and necessary expenses, the costs incurred in lobbying
activity related to their business interests. I.R.C. § 162(e); see note 66 infra and
accompanying text.
52. See note 45 supra and accompanying text; note 55 infra. See generally Slee
v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
53. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. In Slee, the court noted that, in man), cases, political activity could be
within the purpose of a tax-exempt organization and illustrated how various tax-
exempt organizations could permissibly engage in politics, at least to the extent
necessary to realize their aims. Id. For example, societies to prevent cruelty to chil-
dren could persuade concerned citizens to support laws to accomplish their aims;
educational institutions could seek state aid; and literary groups could take part in
efforts to relax the taboos on allegedly obscene material. Id. "All such activities are
mediate to the primary purpose, and would not . . .unclass the promoters. The
agitation is ancillary to the end in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the
association." Id. The organization would be no less exclusively charitable for engag-
ing in that activity. id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954).
59. 100 Cong. Rec. 9604 (1954). Senator Johnson merely stated that "this amend-
ment seeks to extend the provisions of section 501 . . .denying tax-exempt status to
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view of the absence of explanatory legislative history of the campaign
clause, it has been assumed that this clause reflects the treasury neu-
trality rationale of Slee6° and furthers the exclusivity of purpose re-
quirement imposed upon organizations subject to section 501(c)(3).6 '
2. Diminished Importance of Treasury Neutrality
During the half century that has passed since the enactment of
political restrictions on tax-exempt organizations," congressional revi-
sion of tax laws affecting political conduct" has brought into question
the rationale of political restrictions.64 It also indicates that the cam-
paign prohibition is no longer in harmony with the government's
overall tax policy regarding political participation by various sectors of
society. In the Revenue Act of 1962,1 for example, Congress revised
section 162(e) of the Code to permit deductions for direct lobbying
expenses by businesses.' This encouragement of political participa-
tion undermined the government's expressed interest in remaining
neutral and ensuring "tax equilibrium"' 7 with regard to charitable and
not only those people who influence legislation but also to those who intervene in
any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for any public office." Id.
60. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert, denied,
419 U.S. 1107 (1975); see Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470
F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); notes 53-57 supra
and accompanying text. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Code in-
dicating that an incompatibility between charitable and political activities was the
rationale for the Code provision. See 78 Cong. Rec. 5861 (1934). The establishment
clause of the first amendment, however, may make religious and political conduct
incompatible, particularly if such activities are financed by tax subsidies. See pt. II
infra.
61. "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Wilkey, J., concurring) (§ 501(c)(3) disqualification test "is aimed at assuring some
purity in that purpose" for which tax-exempt status was granted (emphasis deleted)),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416
U.S. 752 (1974). See also Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934) (construction of
"charitable" for federal tax purposes is governed by the general, non-tax law of char-
itable trusts); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 374, comment k (1959) ("[a] trust to
promote the success of a particular political party is not charitable"); Clear, Note:
Political Speech of Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code, 41
U. Chi. L. Rev. 352, 373 (1974) (funds spent for partisan campaign activity are not
being used for a charitable purpose).
62. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(amended 1974 and 1976) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.); Rev-
enue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497; Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
64. E.g., Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of
the Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, in 31 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1415,
1430-31, 1447-48 (1973).
65. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
66. Id. § 3, 76 Stat. 973 (codified at I.R.C. § 162(e)).
67. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), the government ex-
pressed its concern for tax equilibrium in its arguments against permitting business
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business organizations. The law was revised because expenses
incurred by businesses for appearances before judicial, executive, and
administrative officials were deductible, and Congress believed that
appearances by business groups before legislators should be "on the
same footing." ' In addition, Congress recognized the advantages of
encouraging businesses to present pertinent information to the legis-
lature during debates on proposed measures.6
deductions for lobbying expenses. "At the present time . . . any campaigns financed
by industry to influence legislation cannot be charged to the Government by taking
these expenses as a deduction. The financing is thus entirely out of the pocket of the
concerns involved. This is equally true as to any citizens' organization which might
be formed to conduct similar campaigns, since contributions to these campaigns
would not qualify as charitable contributions and accordingly are not deductible. The
same is true of labor organizations. Thus tax equilibrium exists. If the expenses of the
business community were to become deductible, this tax equilibrium would be up-
set. While the business community could deduct their expenses, all others could not,
even with respect to the same legislation." Note, David Meets Goliath in the Legisla-
tive Arena: A Losing Battle for an Equal Charitable Voice?, 9 San Diego L. Rev. 944,
952 n.46 (1972) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 12, 35-36, Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)). Compared to charitable organizations, labor organiza-
tions under I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) are accorded a wide latitude in the political arena
because promotion of legislation and political candidates is essential to their exist-
ence. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961); Marker v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 1301, 1303-04 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd sub norn. Marker v.
Schultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although the tax laws do not prohibit
lobbying or campaign activity by labor unions, the Federal Election Campaign Act
does prohibit certain campaign activity by organized labor. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976).
Unlike 501(c)(3) groups, however, such organizations are permitted to establish sepa-
rate segregated funds known as political action committees (PACs). See note 75 infra
and accompanying text.
68. S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 22 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3304, 3325.
69. Id., reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3325. The Senate
Report stated that "[i]t also is desirable that taxpayers who have infonnation bearing
on the impact of present laws, or proposed legislation, on their trades or businesses
not be discouraged in making this information available to the Members of Congress
or legislators at other levels of Government. The presentation of such information to
the legislators is necessary to a proper evaluation on their part of the impact of
present or proposed legislation." Id., reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3325. The report also mentioned that "[t]he deduction of such expenditures
on the part of business also is necessary to arrive at a true reflection of their real
income for tax purposes. In many cases making sure that legislators are a%are of the
effect of proposed legislation may be essential to the very existence of a business."
Id., reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3325. According to the
report, Congress also was influenced by the administrative difliculty of distinguishing
ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in lobbying for business interests.
Id., reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3324-25. See also Haswell
v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1141 (Ct. CL. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107
(1975). Revisions in federal election law also reflect a policy of furthering partisan
political activity. For example, there is no longer a limitation on independent ex-
penditures. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1976).
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The federal tax law does not permit the business taxpayer to de-
duct expenses for participation in political campaign activity."0 Addi-
tionally, corporations and labor organizations are prohibited from
making direct political contributions to candidates for federal office"
to avoid the effect of undue influence of labor and corporate wealth in
federal elections 2 and to alleviate the appearance of political favorit-
ism resulting from large corporate and labor campaign
contributions. '3 Nonetheless, congressional tolerance for corporate
and labor involvement in political campaign activity may be inferred
from the Federal Election Campaign Act 74 because corporate and
labor personnel can establish, administer, and solicit voluntary con-
tributions to political action committees (PACs), and the sponsoring
corporation or union may pay the general administrative expenses of
its PAC.'5 Provided that contributions to the PAC are maintained in
segregated funds and are not intermingled with corporate treasury
70. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2)(A).
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (1980); see 2 U.S.C. § 431(c)
(1976) ("Federal office" includes the offices of President, Vice President, and Senator
or Representative in, and Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress.).
72. Brown, Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1976, 26 Cath. U.L. Rev. 756, 766 (1977); see 39 Cong. Rce. 96
(1905); 41 Cong. Rec. 1451-55 (1907). See also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567,
575 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835-40, nn.36-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
74. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (amended 1974 and 1976) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
75. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (1980). Because the cor-
poration or labor organization may finance solicitation and related PAC activities, the
total amount of contributions donated by individuals can be used for political pur-
poses. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(b) (1980). The sponsoring organization may exercise con-
plete control over the income and expenditures of its separate segregated fund, id. §
114.5(d), including who will be solicited and which candidates will be supported. Id.
The existence of a PAC enhances personal involvement in the political process
through contributions of time and money. It remains unresolved whether and to
what extent a sponsoring entity-corporation or labor union-is able to deduct the
cost of maintaining a PAC as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Arthur
Anderson & Co., Federal Taxation of Political Activities 9 (1980). Whether such ex-
penditures are deductible is not answered in current official IRS interpretations. Id.
It is clear, however, that if the expenses incurred on behalf of the PAC are viewed
as participation or intervention in a campaign on behalf of a political candidate, they
are not deductible. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2)(A). The tax laws also encourage individuals to
engage in the campaign process. The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, title
VII, § 701, 85 Stat. 560 (codified at I.R.C. § 541), added a tax credit for individual
contributions to candidates for public office, organizations, including PACs, and
newsletter funds. It was the stated aim of Congress to "encourage more widespread
financing of political campaigns by small contributions." S. Rep. No. 1357, 93d Cong.
2d Sess. 35 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code & Cong. Ad. News 7478, 7511.
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finances, the PAC funds afford a legal vehicle through which a cor-
poration or labor organization can contribute to political campaigns
and influence legislation, as well as counter-balance the impact of
other special interest groups.'6 Organizations exempt under section
501(c)(3), however, must refrain from political campaign activity and
are, therefore, not permitted to establish PACs.'
The proliferation of federal legislation affecting the election process
can be viewed as congressional consent to subsidize political conduct
in many areas. The tax benefits granted to businesses and labor
groups for partisan activity signify a shift from the Slee treasury neu-
trality doctrine and toward a policy of integrating all voices of the
public sector in "robust and vide open" public debate.' By restrain-
ing the political speech of charitable organizations that qualify for sec-
tion 501(c)(3) status, the present Code, in effect, denies the members
of these organizations, as a whole, an equal opportunity to gain
meaningful representation.' Accordingly, there is considerably less
justification for an absolute governmental prohibition upon partisan
campaign activity by section 501(c)(3) religious organizations.
C. Infringement on Political Expression
The demise of the government's treasury neutrality policy has been
accompanied by the Supreme Court's endorsement of political speech
by all sectors of society. Numerous Court decisions have extended
first amendment speech protection beyond the community of natural
persons to the realm of organizations.' In view of the ability of orga-
76. Brown, supra note 72, at 756 n.2.
77. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-5() (1976) ("The fact that section 527 imposes a
tax on the political expenditures of section 501(c) organizations and permits such
organizations to establish separate segregated funds to make political expenditures
does not sanction these activities by section 501(c)(3) organizations."); see Ltr. Rul.
7904064 (Oct. 15, 1978) (holding that the establishment of a political action commit-
tee is consistent with a veterans' organization's 501(c)(19) status because the "Code
and Regulations themselves are silent as to the permissibility or extent of political
participation or intervention").
78. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see notes 83-86
infra and accompanying text.
79. Despite the intensive interests of exempt organizations in political campaign
issues, they are compelled to refrain from rebutting the assertions of their political
opponents for fear that, if they emerge from silence into the campaign arena, they
will be met with the "fatal injury" of deexemption. "Americans United" Inc. v. Wal-
ters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Com-
missioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). Loss of exempt status for
§ 501(c)(3) organizations also entails loss of qualification for deductibility under I.R.C.
§ 170(c)(2)-the lifeline for associations that rely on public contributions for their
existence. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 906 (4th Cir. 1973), affd
sub nom. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
80. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326
(1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Grosjean
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nizations to effectively amplify the voice of their adherents, the Court
has also recognized the right of freedom of association as a derivative
constitutional right protected by the first amendment.8' Additionally,
because expensive media coverage has become the most influential
means of political speech,8" individuals may find that their viewpoints
are expressed more effectively by group association.
Section 501(c)(3) places direct limitations on the right of tax-exempt
organizations to participate and express their views with regard to the
political process. Political speech activity is "at the core of our elec-
toral process and of the First Amendment freedoms" and is of great
importance in a democratic society. Legislative restrictions on
advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates, therefore,
generally are considered to be in conflict with the guarantees of the
first amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized that
[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of govern-
ment established by our Constitution. The First Amendment
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also Clear, supra note 61. Argu-
ably, in the case of speech, "the organization has no life apart from its members,"
who are responsible for choosing the content of its expressions. Id. at 355 n.18.
Thus, the individual members provide the group with "first amendment protection
sufficient to enable it to challenge section 501(c)(3)'s effect on speech." Id. In addi-
tion, "[a]Ithough the group exercises the direct control over financing of speech, the
final expression coming from the group cannot meaningfully be separated from the
individuals who determined what that expression should be and indirectly provided
the necessary funds." Id.
81. E.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) ("freedom to associate
with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas" is a right
guaranteed by the first amendment); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963)
(first amendment claim may be asserted by nonprofit corporation); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group asso-
ciation"). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964);
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
(1952); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-50 (1936).
82. See Schoenblum, From De Facto To Statutory Exemption: An Analysis of the
Evolution of Legislative Policy Regarding the Federal Taxation of Campaign Financ-
ing, 65 Va. L. Rev. 513. 530 (1979); Seeger, Political Contributions are Free Speech,
66 A.B.A.J. 1490 (1980).
83. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); accord, Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of cam-
paigns for political office."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]herc is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs .... This of course includes
discussions of candidates .... ).
84. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."3
The Court also has declared that "[d]emocracy depends on a well-
informed electorate, not a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability
to discuss and debate candidates and issues."'
Given this mandate, it would appear that a less than absolute re-
striction is permissible. Given the enforcement problems, ' the de-
mise of treasury neutrality,6n and the practical and constitutional im-
portance of group speech," such a change is desirable. Any revision
concerning organized religious expression, however, must conform to
the limitations that the establishment clause imposes upon congres-
sional action.
II. PROSPOSED REVISION
A. Religious Organizations and Section 501(c)(3):
Additional Constitutional Considerations
The religion clauses of the first amendment9o present additional fac-
tors to be considered when balancing the right of religious organiza-
tions to engage in political speech against the interest of the govern-
ment in prohibiting campaign intervention by these groups." The
free exercise clause of the first amendment ensures the right of reli-
gious groups to observe their beliefs without interference from gov-
85. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
86. Id. at 49 n.55. The Buckley Court invalidated the Federal Election Campaign
Act's limits on independent expenditures made by individuals or groups. Id. at 39.
The Court stated that "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal
office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discus-
sion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation."
Id. at 48.
87. See pt. I(A) supra.
88. See pt. I(B) supra.
89. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
90. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof... U.S. Const. amend. 1.
91. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ('only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion"). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam) (a substantial interference with the right to associate and the right to partici-
pate in political activities can be justified if the government can show a "sufficiently




ernment regulation.9" Preaching religious beliefs, therefore, is not
only protected by the free speech guarantee of the first amendment
afforded to all 501(c)(3) organizations,' but has the additional protec-
tion of the free exercise clause. Thus, the right to engage in religious-
ly motivated political proselytizing rests on a strong constitutional
foundation."
On the other hand, there is a strong governmental interest in re-
stricting the political expression of a religious group. The establish-
ment clause requires the government to remain neutral in matters of
religion95 and constructs a wall of separation between church and
state.9" The notion is that "the First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere." Theoretically, the wall isolating the two institutions is im-
permeable from either direction." Total isolation of these two major
forces in a democratic nation, however, is impossible,99 as well as
undesirable.'0° The Supreme Court recognizes that "some involve-
ment and entanglement are inevitable," 101 but insists that "lines must
be drawn."" Thus, any statute governing partisan campaign activity
of tax-exempt religious organizations must be carefully constructed to
reflect these concerns.
92. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (delicate balance be-
tween government interest and religious freedoms); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (right to spread one's religious beliefs limits the police power of the
State).
93. See pt. I(C) supra.
94. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("Religion Clauses ..
specifically and firmly [fix] the right to free exercise of religious beliefs"); First Uni-
tarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545, 548 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("There is no power in our Government to make one bend his religious scruples to
the requirements of this tax law."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305
(1940) ("a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a
denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment").
95. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1963); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611-
25 (1971); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
854-58 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
96. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
97. Id.
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) ("government is to be entirely
excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the affairs
of government").
99. Id.
100. J. Tussman, The Supreme Court on Church and State xvi (1962) (The separa-
tion of church and state has been analogized to the separation of powers, a concept
that suggests separate jurisdictions and a measure of independence, but does not
mandate a complete lack of cooperation and support.).
101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
102. Id.
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B. Revised Section 501(c)(3)
When the Tenth Circuit, in Christian Echoes National Ministry,
Inc. v. United States, 3 upheld the campaign condition in section
501(c)(3),-- it did not conclude that the voice of religious organiza-
tions is constitutionally barred from the political arena. To the con-
trary, the court outlined the alternatives available to a politically con-
scious church. The religious group may refrain from lobbying and
electioneering activities and enjoy the benefits of exempt status, or it
may "'engage in all such activities without restraint, subject, however,
to withholding of the exemption."' Under the present section
501(c)(3), this directive is of no value to religious organizations be-
cause they require exempt status and deductible contributions to
survive.' - Rather, the law should be revised to provide separate tax
treatment for religious organizations."° The proposed revision would
grant tax-exempt status, permit partisan campaign activity, and im-
pose a tax on political expenditures."S Incoming contributions to
103. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S 864 (1973).
104. Id. at 856-57.
105. Id. at 857. One court, in addressing the extent to which religious organiza-
tions should permissibly engage in lobbying, stated that "it is clear that the healthy
working of our political order cannot safely forego the political action of the churches,
or discourage it. The reliance, as always, must be on giving an alert and critical
hearing to every informed voice, and the spokesmen of religious institutions must not
be discouraged, nor inhibited by the fear that their support of legislation, or explicit
lobbying for such legislation, will result in its being constitutionally suspect. That
does not mean that the fact of denominational support is not relevant to analysis of
legislation to determine whether it violates the establishment clause, the law is
otherwise." McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations
omitted), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
106. See note 79 supra.
107. The necessity of separation of church and state implied under the religion
clauses of the first amendment mandate separate tax treatment for sectarian groups.
"For the separation of church and state to be a reality, government must be able to
recognize and articulate the basic differences between churches, business corpora-
tions, labor unions, political parties, schools, hospitals, and museums. If government
lumps churches indiscriminately for legal purposes with any one of these groups,
there cannot be any distinctive separation of church and state." Whelan, Corernmen-
tal Attempts to Define Church and Religion, 446 Annals of the American Academy of
Political & Social Science 32, 33 (1979). It should be noted that § 501(c)13) may be an
unconstitutional restriction upon the political speech of charitable organizations. In
view of the lessened importance of treasury neutrality, see pt. I(B) supra, the abridg-
ment of fundamental first amendment rights may not be justified by a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam). A strong argument can be made, therefore, that tax-exempt charitable
groups should be permitted to engage in political campaign activity, provided that
they do not deviate substantially from their primary purpose. See notes 45, 55 supra
and accompanying text.
108. Tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c) that are permitted to participate in
political activities are taxed on any amount spent for the election process. I.R.C. §
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qualifying organizations would remain tax deductible, regardless of
political activity.
The revision is desirable for two reasons. First, the IRS and reli-
gious groups will no longer be confronted with an all-or-nothing
approach to political participation." The IRS will not be as reluctant
to enforce the revised provision because it need determine only
whether to tax the religious organization upon its political campaign
expenditures. The proposed revision, therefore, will enable the IRS
to deal more effectively with the presence of religious organizations
in the political arena."' Second, it permits the religious sector of
society to engage in political speech at a time when controversial
campaign commentary has been encouraged by both Congress and
the Court."'
In view of the chilling effect that the campaign prohibition has on
section 501(c)(3) groups," 2 the IRS also should clearly delineate what
conduct constitutes participating or intervening in political cam-
paigns. The IRS should revise its regulations to include more precise
definitions, including examples of electioneering conduct, as distin-
guished from essentially charitable or religious activity."' Concededly,
there are no infallible formulas to distinguish valid political means to
charitable or religious ends from political campaigning. The IRS
should, however, establish advisory procedures similar to those uti-
lized by the Federal Election Commission in administering the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act."' Under such a system, tax-exempt orga-
nizations could write to the IRS, or to a special advisory commission,
and request an opinion as to the propriety of a specific political trans-
action or activity in which they are involved."I In this way, tax-
527(f). The tax on such expenditures is calculated at the same corporate rate appli-
cable to political organizations. Id. An alternative plan has been proposed whereby
contributions may be deductible only if the donor earmarks the donation for a spe-
cific use. A fiduciary obligation would thereby be imposed on the recipient religious
group, thus discouraging it from becoming more political than religious. Under this
scheme, contributions made without stipulation as to use would be nondeductible.
This program would both prevent large donors from using religious organizations to
promote social or political views and eliminate the need for detailed examination.
Religion in Politics, supra note 39, at 423.
109. See notes 42, 43 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 7, 8 supra and accompanying text.
111. See pts. I(B), (C) supra.
112. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
113. See generally note 55 supra.
114. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437(0)(a)(1) (1976). See also Response to Advisory Opin-
ion Request 1978-62, 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6085 (July 19, 1979).
115. The IRS should enumerate specific examples of political campaign involve-
ment. Such examples should include letters by religious officials to congregations on
church stationery directing voting choices, The Archbishop and Abortion, supra note
8, at 26, cols. 1-2, articles and editorials appearing in church newspapers endorsing
specific candidates, Churches, Politics And the Tax Man, supra note 19, at 46, and
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exempt religious organizations will be aware of conduct that will incur
a tax 116 and then decide whether to be politically active.
It is possible that the proposed revision may be challenged consti-
tutionally as violative of the establishment clause. Although internal
church communication concerning issues of morality has never been
cause for alarm, when church leaders seek the aid of legislators and
politicians to ban evil elements in our society the wall of separation
has been raised by courts to preclude such advocacy."' Admittedly,
in Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Court stated that "[i]t conflicts with our
whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and
problems that confront every level of government." "" The Court, in
considering the divisive political potential of providing public aid to
parochial schools, envisioned that candidates would be forced to
address issues of this kind and voters consequently would "find their
votes aligned with their faith." 120 From this language, it would
appear that the mixture of religion and politics in American life is
always inappropriate.
sermons advocating specific issues closely related to certain candidates' views. The
Archbishop and Abortion, supra note 8, § A, at 26, cols. 1-2.
116. Under the present system, an organization max' refer to Revenue Rulings for
some suggestion as to how their conduct may be treated. A Revenue Ruling is de-
fined as "an official interpretation by the Service that has been published ... for the
information and guidance of taxpayers, Internal Revenue Service officials, and others
concerned." Rev. Proc. 69-1, 1969-1 C.B. 381, § 2.05. Revenue Rulings are not law
and are not binding on courts. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938).
Identical situations may be subject to different tax treatment. Therefore, an organiza-
tion should not have to rely on prior Revenue Rulings, but should be able to avail
itself of advisory opinions addressing its specific situation.
117. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. Id. at 623.
120. Id. at 622. Decker v. O'Donnell, No. 80-1230 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980), is the
most recent case concerning the potential for political divisiveness and the establish-
ment clause. In this case, the placement of CETA workers in sectarian schools was
"prohibited . . . because the structure of decisionmaking about funding creates an
impermissible risk of political entanglement." Id., slip. op. at 28. The district court
in Decker emphasized that, because there are a limited amount of funds available,
the process of allocating public money is a competitive one. Id., slip op. at 7. The
process whereby a single elected official awards the funds according to his discretion,
combined with the presence of religious groups among the possible recipients, gives
rise to impermissible political entanglement, rendering the CETA program
unconstitutional. Id. Tax exemptions do not raise an entanglement issue in terms of
political divisiveness because of the large size of the benefitted class. See Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). See also
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 n.8
(1980) (statute authorizing use of public funds to reimburse church-sponsored and
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In view of the broad scope of religious concerns, however, it may
be unreasonable, 2 1 if not impossible, to separate churches from
national and world affairs.2 Moreover, an attempt to do so may be
unwarranted in view of the Court's historical note in Walz v. Tax
Commission 123 that "for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." '2 In addressing the separation argument that is
associated with the Establishment Clause, the Court stated that "[n]o
perfect or absolute separation is really possible." '2 The Constitution
simply commands that government not establish religion nor interfere
with religion."3 6 The Court recognized "the very existence of the Re-
ligion Clauses [as] an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark
boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." 1z'
The Supreme Court announced its decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman" only one year after its declarations in Walz.' It is in-
secular nonpublic schools for performing state required testing services upheld be-
cause it is not likely to provoke religious battles over legislative appropriations);
Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749 & n.16, 765-66 (1976)
(state program giving state funds to private institutions of higher education, including
schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, upheld because no substantial
danger of political entanglement).
121. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court stated that
"[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong posi-
tions on public issues including, as this case reveals . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or
constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private
citizens have that right." Id. at 670.
122. Even before the adoption of the first amendment, the Constitution provided
that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States." U.S. Const. art. 6. Nonetheless, voters do
regard the religious beliefs of a candidate as a relevant aspect of his character, J.
Tussman, supra note 100, at xvii. The tendency of voters to support the candidates
of their own religious affiliation was particularly apparent during President Kennedy's
campaign. M. Stedman, Religion and Politics in America 115-17 (1964).
123. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
124. Id. at 668. The Court conceded that "[t]he Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions
of the Constitution" and admitted its struggle "to find a neutral course between the
two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. at 668-69.
125. Id. at 670.
126. Id. at 669. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Justice Douglas de-
cdared that "[t]he First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be separation of Church and State." Id. at 312. The Court in Zorach was
not primarily concerned with the absolute isolation of religion and government, but
rather that the government show "no partiality to any one group and . . . lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." Id. at
313.
127. 397 U.S. at 670.
128. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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conceivable that in so doing the Court was revoking its prior inter-
pretation of the Religion Clauses. Instead, the incongruity of the
dicta and holdings in the two decisions may be attributed to the fac-
tual situation presented in Lemon. They can be reconciled by the
Court's directive in Lemon that "lines must be drawn" to avoid exces-
sive entanglement.13 The crucial test of any revision of section
501(c)(3), therefore, is to determine whether the new language will
give rise to excessive entanglement.
Whereas the present provision imposes an absolute prohibition on
political campaign activity by religious organizations, the proposed re-
vision would permit, but tax,"' such activity." Theoretically, the
establishment clause would in neither case be violated because
federal funds would not be used to subsidize partisan activity. The
proposed revision would more adequately reflect the purpose under-
lying the establishment clause. Religious organizations are presently
130. 403 U.S. at 625.
131. Presently, churches, conventions, and associations of churches are not re-
quired to file financial reports with the IRS. I.R.C. § 6033(2)(A)(i). See also I.R.C. §
7605(c) (restricting scope of church audits based on principle of noninterference).
Permitting electioneering activity by church groups will require public disclosure of
political expenditures. Traditionally, the government has acted cautiously when deal-
ing with religion. The Supreme Court has expressed concern that government agen-
cies should not be put in a situation requiring surveillance of religious institutions.
Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749 & n.16, 765-66 (1976).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971). In addition, in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court noted that taxation of religious organizations
creates a greater degree of entanglement than exemption. Id. at 674. This would
seem to raise the wall between church and state to bar government investigations of
church activity. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether taxation creates excessive
entanglement. See notes 127, 130 supra and accompanying text. Thus, when the IRS
sought production of church documents necessary to investigate tax liability, the
Fifth Circuit stated that "[a] defense against disclosure based upon religious objec-
tions can find First Amendment support only if the disclosure either serves to estab-
lish religion or impedes the free exercise of sectarian conviction." United States v.
Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980). The court deemed disclosure an "in-
cidental burden on church religious activities" and considered the "government['s]
interest in maintaining the integrity of its fiscal policies ... sufficiently compelling to
justify any incidental infringement of plaintiff's First Amendment rights." Id. at 990,
see Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
132. The revision may be suspect in that the restrictions are aimed at ensuring the
purity of purpose for which a § 501(c)(3) organization is granted its exemption. See
note 45 supra and accompanying text. Religious organizations, however, claim that
their political acts are religiously motivated. Although it may be difficult for the IRS
or a court to determine when religion ends and politics begin, the revision will
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engaged in campaign conduct 113 -at the American taxpayers' ex-
pense. Under the proposed revision, religious organizations would be
paying out of "their own pockets" without suffering the loss of exempt
status when they choose to participate in the political campaign are-
na. Consequently, the constitutional mandates of free speech and
separation of church and state will be fulfilled.
Judy Ann Rosenblum
simply require a tax to be levied on an organization when it is found to be acting in
support of a candidate. The tax will have the practical financial effect of ensuring that
religious organizations do not deviate substantially from their primary purpose.
133. See notes 7, 8 supra and accompanying text.
